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1. Introduction	  
Since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the rules of world trade 
have not changed. They do not account for the fact that the nature of international division of 
labor is no longer the one that prevailed during the negotiations in the Uruguay Round which 
led to the WTO (1986-1994). At that time, the geopolitical situation was entirely different than 
today’s: the Soviet Union still existed, and the acronym “BRICS” was still unknown. Since 
then, the opening up of emerging markets such as China, both unilaterally and through its acces-
sion to the WTO, and other unilateral steps towards trade liberalization in many other develop-
ing countries, plus the arrival of modern information and communication technology, have 
changed the global economy. Countries no longer exchange final goods and raw materials with 
each other. Now, trade happens along global production chains: many firms in many different 
countries contribute towards the production of final goods by supplying parts and components, 
various services, and the final assembly. Goods are no longer made in one country for export, 
but they are made in the world for the world.  
The reality of global production networks implies the need for new rules that go beyond the 
code book of the WTO and that speed up international transactions, make them more secure and 
less costly. This relates, for example, to services, the movement of professionals, investment 
liberalization and protection, the enforcement of intellectual property rights, the mutual recogni-
tion of product and process standards, regulatory cooperation, simplification and harmonization 
of rules and bureaucratic procedures, and many more topics. Since the WTO has not been able 
to broaden and deepen its rules, countries around the world are turning towards arrangements 
that involve smaller sets of countries and that tackle the aforementioned issues with different 
degrees of ambition reflecting the needs and development status of the involved economies. In a 
sense, the move towards mega-regional trade agreements reflects both the WTO’s failure to 
modernize its rules and the need for differential treatment amongst different countries.  
The negotiations between the EU and the US to create a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) are spear-heading this dynamic evolution, but many other regions are also 
integrating more and more closely; see Part II of this study. Here, we investigate how the move 
away from the multilateral trade order as epitomized by the WTO affects third countries and 
what can be done that the emergence of a new world trade order does not lead to a substantial 
deterioration of development perspectives in poor regions or countries. The EU treaties require 
the Union to take the effects of its trade policies on poor countries into account, the goal being 
to avoid that commercial policy initiatives compromise the EU’s goals to facilitate sustainable 
development worldwide.  
The TTIP between the EU and the US would cover about 45% of world GDP, 11.5% of the 
world’s population (as of 2013), and approximately 30% of world exports (as of 2012). Because 
of the sheer economic size of the involved parties, the formation of TTIP will have important 
effects for third countries. First, third countries may suffer from trade diversion. When the US 
grants the EU preferential access to its market, EU goods will become relatively cheaper for US 
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consumers and EU intermediate inputs will become relatively cheaper for US manufacturers. 
Thus the US will substitute away from third countries’ goods towards EU goods. The same 
holds for US products on the EU markets. So trade is diverted away from third countries to-
wards TTIP partners. Trade diversion has the potential to hurt developing countries. However, it 
depends on the types of goods the developing countries export to the EU and the US. In many 
raw materials and resource categories, like e.g. cocoa beans, EU and US products are not com-
petitive or they are not produced because of climatic reasons. Thus, they cannot displace devel-
oping countries’ exports. On the other hand, countries that predominantly export manufacturing 
goods are more likely to suffer from trade diversion. So whether and to what extent trade diver-
sion will occur depends on the industrial structure of the respective country. 
For the most goods, many developing countries already have preferential access to the EU and 
US market respectively (e.g. through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or the Eve-
rything But Arms (EBA) initiatives).1 So one might think, that trade diversion will not be an 
issue for these countries. However, they still might suffer from preference erosion. When TTIP 
lowers tariff or non-tariff barriers between the EU and the US, goods from within TTIP become 
cheaper relatively to goods from outside TTIP, regardless of the initial tariff exemption. Clearly, 
the amount of preference erosion depends on the size of the initial preference margin, i.e., the 
difference between the tariff imposed by either EU or US on each other’s goods and the lower 
preferential tariff granted to developing countries.  
The negative substitution effect described above can be counteracted by a positive income ef-
fect. To the extent that the EU and the US become richer due to TTIP and that their production 
rises, their demand for intermediates and final goods will rise. Especially countries in the Euro-
pean or US production network may benefit from this increased demand in the EU and US. 
Another positive channel for third countries arises via imported competitiveness. If TTIP in-
creases the competitiveness of EU and US producers of capital goods and intermediate goods, 
so that these become cheaper, countries which import these goods from the TTIP region may 
benefit from these cost reductions and become more competitive. 
In summary, TTIP will have opposing effects on developing countries. In developing countries 
which produce raw materials that are not produced in the EU or the US the positive income 
effect will most likely dominate the negative trade diversion effect. As a consequence, they may 
slightly benefit from TTIP. Countries with a production structure similar to the EU and the US, 
on the other hand, will most likely suffer from trade diversion. But if the countries are very 
tightly integrated into the EU or US production network, the positive effects through increased 
goods demand in the EU and the US may still dominate. So we expect that countries closer to 
the EU or USA will be hurt less from TTIP. Which effect dominates in which country cannot be 
                                            
1 Under these preference systems, developed countries grant developing countries tariff-free access to their markets 
for many goods in a unilateral, non-reciprocal way. These systems constitute an exemption from the WTO’s most 
favored nation principle, by which any country applies the same tariffs to any other WTO member. The European 
“Everything but Arms” (EBA) program and the US’ “Africa Growth and Opportunity Act” (AGOA) go beyond 
the GSP systems by allowing a broader range of products tariff-free into their countries. 
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ascertained without the use of a general equilibrium model of international trade. In this part of 
the study, we use such a tool (described in Aichele et al., 2014). The framework features nation-
al and international input-output linkages to account for global value added chains. It also in-
cludes sufficient sectoral detail to factor in cross-country differences in industrial structure and 
in the sector structure of tariff and non-tariff protection. 
Despite almost two years of negotiations, very few details on the proposed TTIP agreements are 
known. Therefore, we work with simplifying assumptions. In our model, we distinguish be-
tween tariffs-only agreements, shallow ones (which address some non-tariff barriers) and deep 
ones (which one may also refer to as last generation deals). Most importantly, we assume that 
TTIP will lower trade costs – tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers – between the EU and the US 
by the same amount that other deep agreements have. In our default specification, we do not 
assume that the agreement also lowers trade costs between TTIP insiders and outsiders, or with-
in the group of TTIP outsiders. We do not do so, because there is little existing evidence that 
would support such an assumption (see WTO, 2012). This does not mean, though, that trade 
cost savings cannot spill-over to third parties, either, because regulatory cooperation between 
the EU and the US ultimately result in the establishment of global standards which would also 
facilitate market access for developing countries, or because the TTIP agreement contains 
clauses that make deliberate efforts to assist developing countries. 
In this part of the study, we first portray the winners and losers of TTIP and discuss the possible 
reasons behind the observed patterns. Then we turn our attention to the evaluation of further 
regional mega-deals currently being negotiated and on how they impact developing countries. 
Finally, we discuss policy options. 
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2. TTIP	  and	  developing	  countries	  
2.1. Losers	  and	  winners	  
While on the world level, TTIP raises real income by 1.3%, on average, the outlook for develop-
ing countries is less optimistic. On average, developing countries may expect a small reduction 
in real income of -0.06%. This implies a loss of relative importance of developing countries: 
their share in world GDP drops from 23.0 to 22.7%. 
But the losses are not universal. The predicted effects on real income are in the range of -0.9% 
to +0.8%. So there is big heterogeneity in the third-country effects. Figure 1 shows the welfare 
effects of TTIP in a color-coded world map. The graph is accompanied by a table of the 10 big-
gest losers from TTIP, see Table 1.  
 
Figure 1 World map of real income changes from deep TTIP, in % 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
The biggest winners from TTIP are to be found in the Rest of Europe, Central Asia and the Eur-
asian Customs Union. Broadly, three regions will have to suffer sustained welfare losses from 
TTIP. As shown in Table 1, these are first and foremost China, ASEAN countries, and East 
Asia (i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan). Cambodia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand are most 
affected in this region, with real income losses of 0.9, 0.5, 0.4 and 0.3%, respectively. China and 
the Philippines are also predicted to face a reduction of real income of around a quarter of a 
percent. Apparently, the Asian production network is hampered by the formation of TTIP.  
The model also predicts welfare losses for some countries in Latin America, especially for 
countries of the Pacific Alliance and to a lesser extent also Argentina (-0.04%) and Bra-
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zil (0.01%). Costa Rica and Chile suffer real income losses of around 0.18%, Peru of 0.15% and 
Mexico of 0.08%, while, in the contrary, Colombia will have a small rise in real income of 
0.09%.  
While most countries in Africa, especially the North African countries which are close to the 
EU, gain from TTIP, a few countries in the South of the African continent like Swaziland and 
Lesotho (-0.67%), Mozambique (-0.17%) or Zambia (-0.10%) would face welfare losses. 
Table 1 The 10 biggest losers from TTIP among developing countries 
Rank	   Country	   Region	   Population	  
(mn.)	  
Change	  in	  
per	  capita	  
income	  (%)	  
Trend	  growth	  
rate	  (%)	  
1	   Cambodia	   ASEAN	   14.1	   -­‐0.9	   8.2	  
2	   Swaziland	   SACU	   1.2	   -­‐0.7	   5.4	  
3	   Malaysia	   ASEAN	   28.4	   -­‐0.5	   2.4	  
4	   Taiwan	   East	  Asia	   23.1	   -­‐0.4	   3.0	  
5	   Thailand	   ASEAN	   69.1	   -­‐0.3	   3.3	  
6	   Mongolia	   Central	  Asia	   2.8	   -­‐0.3	   9.2	  
7	   China	   China	   1318.2	   -­‐0.3	   8.0	  
8	   Philippines	   ASEAN	   93.3	   -­‐0.2	   0.7	  
9	   Costa	  Rica	   Allianza	  del	  Pacifico	   4.7	   -­‐0.2	   0.1	  
10	   Korea,	  Republic	  of	   East	  Asia	   48.2	   -­‐0.2	   4.5	  
Population	  weighted	  average	   	  	   -­‐0.3	   7.1	  
Source: Authors’ calculation. Change in real per capita income due to introduction of TTIP (deep scenario); trend 
growth rate calculated as average of yearly growth rate of real per capita income since 2000 (Penn World Tables 8.0, 
series rgdpo). 
It is important to put negative per capita income effects into perspective. Similar to the welfare 
benefits in TTIP countries, losses in non-TTIP countries build up over a period of about 10 
years. And they are permanent: every year after the ramp-up period income will be lower by the 
simulated amount than without TTIP. The country with the largest loss amongst all countries, 
Cambodia, suffers a loss in yearly income of 0.9%. This is particularly regrettable, because 
Cambodia is a very poor country. However, its catch-up is in full swing: since 2000, its average 
yearly growth rate of real per capita income was 8.2%. So, the loss due to TTIP is only about 
one ninth of an average yearly growth rate. In the case of China, the loss due to TTIP is only 
one thirtieth of an average yearly growth rate. Other countries with more dismal growth perfor-
mance, suffer proportionately more from TTIP. This is so in the case of the Philippines or Costa 
Rica. Looking at population weighted averages over the 10 most affected countries, we find that 
the average loss is 0.3%. As a matter of facts, in the group of severely affected countries, the 
most affected ones have relatively small populations. 
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2.2 	  Derminants	  of	  losses	  and	  gains 
To understand the heterogeneity of welfare effects among developing countries, we investigate 
potential drivers of the observed patterns.2 Is it preference erosion which hurts some countries, 
and if so, which ones? Are those countries hurt which have a similar production structure than 
the EU or the US? Is proximity to the TTIP countries important, because it implies close links to 
their production chains and potentially beneficial income effects? Does market size play a role? 
Figure 2 Welfare effects of TTIP and countries’ initial specialization 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Regression lines with 95% confidence intervals fitted to the data. 
                                            
2 Felbermayr et al. (2015) have conducted detailed case studies on the potential effects of TTIP for a number of de-
veloping countries 
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Welfare effects and specialization: From our previous discussion on trade diversion effects, 
we would expect countries with a similar specialization structure as the EU or USA to suffer 
more from TTIP. Indeed, this might be the reason behind the predicted welfare losses in China, 
Japan, Korea and the ASEAN countries. First, we inspect the overall correlation of a respective 
country’s sectoral output shares with the one of the EU and the US, see the upper part of Figure 
2. We find no evidence for a negative impact of a similar structure on welfare changes. Trade is 
predominantly in manufacturing goods, so next we investigate the correlation of sectoral shares 
in manufacturing only. Here we find a clear negative effect. The more similar the sectoral struc-
ture, the lower the welfare gain or the higher the welfare loss, respectively. To some extent, this 
pattern also emerges when looking at the correlations in the revealed comparative advantage 
structure (RCA) (for manufacturing trade).3 At least when countries have a high correlation in 
their RCA with the EU, they experience lower welfare gains on average. 
Welfare and market size: On the one hand, economic theory suggests that countries with small 
internal markets which get better access to a larger common market will benefit more than rela-
tively big countries. On the other hand, we do not expect that trade diversion is related to third 
countries’ market size, so we should not see an effect here. This notion is supported by a graph-
ical inspection in Figure 3 of the relation between welfare changes and two measures for market 
size: the log of population and the log of national income. For TTIP countries, we clearly see a 
negative relation between market size and predicted welfare change. For non-TTIP countries, 
such a relation is not existent. 
Welfare and preference erosion: Countries that already have preferential access to the EU or 
the USA will suffer more trade diversion effects from TTIP because the previously held prefer-
ences are eroded. To see whether such a pattern emerges in our simulated results, we regress (in 
a non-TTIP sample) the welfare change from TTIP on two dummy variables indicating whether 
the respective country has an FTA with the USA and the EU, respectively. Column 1 in Table 2 
indicates that having an FTA with the EU might actually increase welfare gains from TTIP. This 
runs counter our previous conjecture. However, this mere correlation may confound the influ-
ence of distance and other variables. So in Column 2 we add distance as an additional regressor. 
The results do not change. Having an FTA with the EU has a positive effect, while having an 
FTA with the US does not seem to matter. Countries further away from the EU or US are worse 
off with TTIP. Increasing the distance with USA by 1% reduces welfare gains by 0.1 percentage 
points, increasing the distance to Germany by 1% reduces welfare gains by 0.07 percentage 
points. However, when we interact having an FTA with distance, then we indeed find a story of 
preference erosion. Having an FTA with the EU or the USA reduces welfare gains. But the fur-
ther one is away from the respective region, the less relevant this effect becomes. 
                                            
3 Revealed comparative advantage is computed as the share of a country's exports in some industry divided by the 
proportion of world exports in that industry. A country is said to have a comparative advantage in the industry under 
consideration if RCA>1 and a comparative disadvantage else. 
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Figure 3 Welfare effects of TTIP and country’s market size 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 2 Welfare effects of TTIP and preference erosion 
FTA	  with	  EU	  (0,1) 0.148*** 0.114** -­‐1.038**	  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.512)
FTA	  with	  USA	  (0,1) 0.001 -­‐0.038 -­‐1.912**	  
(0.051) (0.046) (0.862)
Ln	  distance	  to	  USA -­‐0.101** -­‐0.254***
(0.039) (0.089)
Ln	  distance	  to	  Germany -­‐0.074** -­‐0.121***
(0.03) (0.041)
FTA	  with	  USA	  *	  ln	  distance	  USA 0.208**	  
(0.096)
FTA	  with	  EU	  *	  ln	  distance	  Germany 0.134**	  
(0.062)
Constant 0.009 1.589*** 3.417***
(0.039) (0.418) (0.933)
Observations 86 86 86
R-­‐squared 0.099 0.203 0.257
Welfare	  change	  (in	  %)
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Welfare and distance: Our conjecture is that countries close to TTIP countries may benefit 
more from positive income effects in the TTIP region, since they are part of the relevant produc-
tion networks and can more easily participate in the economic expansion that should result from 
TTIP in the US and Europe. And indeed, Figure 4 suggests a negative relationship between 
distance and welfare effects. Close countries tend to benefit from TTIP, while far away coun-
tries have lower benefits or even a welfare loss. The relationship is more clear-cut when looking 
at the distance to Germany than when looking at the distance to the US. 
Welfare and production networks: We use the share of a trade partner’s value added in the 
total value added that is finally processed in the EU or the USA, respectively (in graph in %) as 
a measure for the depth of links in global value added networks. The linear fits presented in 
Figure 5 reveal a weakly negative relationship. Note that higher initial levels mean greater trade 
diversion. Alternatively, one can use the trade partner’s share in intermediates processed in the 
EU and USA, respectively. Results turn out to be quite similar. 
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Figure 4 Welfare effects from TTIP and distance from TTIP insiders 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Figure 5 European and US production networks and welfare effects of TTIP 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Welfare and initial trade exposure with TTIP countries: With respect to commercial links to 
the US, there seems to be a negative relationship between welfare changes in developing coun-
tries and shares of exports to the USA: countries with higher exports to the USA suffer relative-
ly more from the increased EU competition in the US market. This signals the role of trade di-
version. For high imports from the USA, no clear pattern emerges. This is consistent with a 
weak or non-existent “imported competitiveness” effect. 
With respect to trade links of TTIP outsiders to the EU, the higher the exports to the EU tend to 
be, the better off are countries with TTIP. The same seems to be true for the initial import share 
from the EU. A possible explanation is the force of the EU production network, which is pre-
sumably stronger than the US one as the EU is a much more important trade partner for devel-
oping countries than the US. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show quadratic fits of these relationships. 
 
Figure 6 Welfare effects of TTIP and initial trade with the USA 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 7 Welfare effects of TTIP and initial trade with the EU 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
2.3 	  The	  force	  of	  spillover	  effects 
What happens, if TTIP not only lowers trade costs between the EU and the US but also between 
TTIP insiders and outsiders and/or within the group of TTIP outsiders? One reason why this 
could happen is that with the formation of the FTA, product standards might be harmonized, 
regulations on rules of origin might be relaxed or state aid for domestic firms might be out-
lawed. This leads to a reduction of trade costs between the FTA countries and their trade part-
ners; a possibility referred to as spillover effect in the literature, see CEPR (2013). To simulate 
this, we create two TTIP spillover scenarios. In a first scenario, trade costs for third countries’ 
exports to TTIP countries fall.4 This is called a scenario of one-way spillovers, and it is sup-
posed to reflect the easing of rules of origins and product standard harmonization or mutual 
recognition extended to third countries in the TTIP area. In a second scenario, we more broadly 
symmetrically reduce trade costs of all third country trade links as well. These indirect spillo-
vers could be the result of a new global product standard emerging from TTIP. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of welfare changes for the basic scenario of a deep TTIP (blue 
line) as well as for the two spillover scenarios. The distribution in the base scenario has two 
peaks. One peak is centered around zero which shows the welfare changes of non-TTIP coun-
tries, and the second peak occurs at around 2.5%, the average real income increase registered by 
                                            
4 In the scenario, we use a trade cost reduction for exports into the TTIP trade bloc of 20% of the FTA 
effect. 
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TTIP countries. With direct spillovers (red distribution), both peaks shift to the right. Direct 
spillovers tend to improve welfare both for TTIP and non-TTIP countries, but more so for non-
TTIP countries. When indirect spillovers are present (green distribution), all countries have 
welfare gains from TTIP. Especially non-TTIP countries may benefit from the falling global 
trade costs. 
 
Figure 8 Distribution of welfare changes with and without regulatory spillovers 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Figure 9 Comparison of TTIP’s real income effects (in %) without and with spillover effects 
shows the country-specific real income effects of TTIP for the different scenarios; Table 3 pro-
vides regional averages.  The upper panel refers to the baseline situation without spillovers. The 
middle part shows the effects of the one-way trade cost reduction with third countries. The low-
er part refers to the two-way trade cost reduction between TTIP countries and third countries. 
Spillover effects will buffer a lot of the negative welfare consequences for third countries. 
Countries which would have to tolerate a welfare loss from TTIP, in particular ASEAN coun-
tries and other East Asian countries like China, Japan and South Korea, will instead see small 
increases in their real income with the one-way trade cost reduction due to, e.g., simplification 
of rules of origin and harmonization of standards. What is more, the welfare of TTIP countries 
is also further advanced in this scenario. The positive welfare effects for negotiating countries as 
well as their trade partners outside the FTA negotiations should increase the likelihood of politi-
cal enforceability of FTAs with standard harmonization. 
If the spillover effects not only accrue for imports into TTIP but for the two-way trade of TTIP 
with third countries, the welfare effects are substantially positive for all countries, ranging from 
0.2% to 10% in the particular scenario 
In summary, accompanying FTAs with measures that create spillover effects for third countries 
is beneficial for the FTA countries. Furthermore, it also increases welfare in trade partners. This 
means, if TTIP effectively works like a multilateral trade policy initiative, lowering not only 
trade costs of insiders but also those of outsiders, everyone benefits. Thus, one should encour-
age policy makers and negotiators to find ways that make sure that TTIP does indeed help out-
siders as well. We come back to this in the policy section of this report. 
In our baseline scenario, we have opted not to implement spillovers. CEPR (2013) has made a 
different choice. As a consequence, that study does not talk about possible losses that TTIP 
could inflict on third countries. The point is that there is almost no empirical evidence available 
that proofs the existence of spillovers for past episodes of regional regulatory cooperation (e.g., 
within the European Union’s single market program). WTO (2012) surveys this literature: “To 
sum up, evidence suggests that regional integration of TBT/SPS [Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)] measures has trade-diverting effects, especially to the 
detriment of developing countries.” (World Trade Report, 2012, page 152). A more comprehen-
sive review of the literature is provided by Felbermayr et al. (2015a). 
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Figure 9 Comparison of TTIP’s real income effects (in %) without and with spillo-
ver effects (upper panel: baseline; middle panel: one-way spillovers; lower panel: 
indirect spillovers), % changes of real per capita income. 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3 Regional real income changes (%) from TTIP with and without regulatory 
spillovers 
Base	  scenario 1-­‐way	  spillover 2-­‐way	  spillover
EU27 2.443 2.749 2.944
USA 2.680 3.254 3.443
Canada 0.123 0.492 2.181
EFTA 0.097 0.595 2.471
Turkey 0.101 0.354 1.368
Rest	  of	  Europe 0.146 0.520 2.128
Australia	  &	  New	  Zealand 0.077 0.188 0.803
Oceania 0.063 0.339 1.261
ASEAN -­‐0.083 0.087 0.379
China -­‐0.255 0.186 0.721
East	  Asia -­‐0.115 -­‐0.008 0.203
South	  Asia -­‐0.130 0.329 0.643
Eurasian	  Customs	  Union 0.144 0.250 0.966
Central	  Asia 0.041 0.188 1.280
Middle	  East	  &	  North	  Africa 0.155 0.366 1.651
Oil	  exporters 0.456 0.695 2.898
Southern	  African	  Customs	  Union 0.256 0.188 0.707
Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa 0.803 0.744 3.042
Alianza	  del	  Pacifico -­‐0.177 0.264 0.918
MERCOSUR -­‐0.045 0.252 0.617
Latin	  America	  &	  Caribbean 0.038 0.162 0.623
Rest	  of	  World -­‐0.100 0.152 0.437
Average	  welfare	  change	  (in	  %)
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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3. The	  new	  emerging	  world	  trade	  order	  and	  developing	  coun-­‐
tries	  
The transatlantic trade talks are only one component in a larger reshuffling of the world trade 
order. If simultaneously to TTIP, multilateral trade negotiations could be revived and the (hypo-
thetical) elimination of all tariffs within the WTO would be agreed upon, additional benefits can 
be expected for almost all regions. Particularly so for WTO members which still have high av-
erage tariff rates like China, and countries in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern 
African Customs Union, or the Eurasian Customs Union. The regional averages are given in 
Column 2 of Table 4. The average world real income would rise by 1.6%, 0.3 percentage points 
of which being the additional effect of the elimination of WTO tariffs. 
Table 4 Western mega regionals and their impact on regional real income (in %) 
	  Region	  	   	  TTIP	  	   	  TTIP,	  TPP,	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  +	  no	  	   	  +	  TPP	  	   	  RCEP	  	   	  +	  no	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  WTO	  	   	  +	  RCEP	  	   	  +	  EU-­‐JPN	  	   	  WTO	  	  
	  	   	  	   tariffs 	  	   	  +	  EU-­‐CAN	  	   tariffs
China -­‐0.231 0.414 1.993 -­‐0.388 -­‐0.744 -­‐0.092
ASEAN -­‐0.194 0.420 1.611 0.620 -­‐0.447 0.193
East	  Asia -­‐0.129 0.319 2.626 2.893 5.870 6.189
Alianza	  del	  Pacifico -­‐0.074 -­‐0.156 0.143 0.164 0.623 0.585
MERCOSUR 0.005 0.198 0.033 0.040 0.040 0.238
South	  Asia 0.060 1.248 1.059 0.140 0.119 1.305
Oceania 0.063 -­‐0.019 0.595 0.462 0.410 0.395
Australia	  &	  New	  Zealand 0.077 0.546 6.881 5.076 9.630 9.900
Oil	  exporters 0.085 0.706 0.685 0.637 0.688 1.282
Turkey 0.101 0.297 0.206 0.238 7.319 7.326
Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa 0.105 0.810 0.363 0.312 0.481 1.198
Latin	  America	  &	  Caribbean 0.113 0.440 0.347 0.396 0.536 0.848
Middle	  East	  &	  North	  Africa 0.115 0.651 0.313 0.334 1.094 1.619
Canada 0.123 0.187 2.204 4.687 5.529 5.552
EFTA 0.146 0.478 0.148 0.312 7.681 7.817
Southern	  African	  Customs	  Union 0.150 0.673 0.280 0.430 0.512 1.057
Eurasian	  Customs	  Union 0.172 0.888 0.377 0.438 0.634 1.359
Central	  Asia 0.201 0.211 0.444 0.474 0.634 0.613
Rest	  of	  Europe 0.292 0.461 0.539 0.682 0.982 1.128
Rest	  of	  World 0.399 0.568 1.054 0.758 1.668 1.809
EU27 2.120 2.264 2.175 3.406 4.456 4.582
USA 2.680 2.774 4.084 4.170 4.553 4.621
	  TTIP	  	   	  OECD	  FTA	  	  
 
 Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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3.1.	  TTIP,	  CETA,	  EU-­‐Japan,	  TPP,	  RCEP	  and	  developing	  countries	  
TTIP is not the only prominent FTA currently negotiated. The EU has negotiated a treaty with 
Canada, is in the process of negotiating an FTA with Japan; the US is involved in negotiating 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership and ASEAN negotiates with China, Australia and other FTA part-
ners about a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 
If, aside from the formation of TTIP, a new world trade order would emerge with additional 
treaties like CETA, EU-Japan, TPP and RCEP, our simulations predict a higher average world 
welfare increase of 2.6%, compared to 1.3% with TTIP alone. Developing countries could ex-
pect a smaller than average real income increase of 0.07%. This average effect again masks a 
strong heterogeneity of effects across developing countries, ranging from -1.1 to +5.0%. 
Cambodia (-1.16%), Thailand (-0.48%) and China (-0.42%) cannot capture the positive effects 
of the RCEP (+16%, +10% and +7%, respectively, in a scenario with RCEP, TPP and TTIP) in 
this scenario. About half of those countries’ exports go to the EU, the US, and Japan. So they 
greatly suffer from trade diversion from an EU-Japan FTA. The same pattern emerges for other 
ASEAN countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam, even 
though especially Malaysia and Vietnam still capture large welfare increases of 2.5 and 5%, 
respectively. 
Most countries belonging to the Pacific Alliance in South America (Chile, Columbia, Costa 
Rica, Peru, Mexico) are also better off in this scenario than with TTIP alone. 
Figure 10 Real income changes in a new world trade order, in % 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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3.2.	  The	  containment	  of	  China	  
Until recently, China has not played a major role in the creation of regional free trade zones. 
After its accession to the WTO in 2001, which freed its trade not only with the EU and the US 
but with more than 150 other WTO members, most of them developing or emerging, there was 
very limited appetite in Asia and elsewhere for even closer integration with the Middle King-
dom. The emergence of international production chains centered around China has started to 
change this perspective. 
Moreover, China has also become more assertive in its trade policy strategy. It has concluded 13 
trade agreements and notified them to the WTO. Some of them are due to the existence of spe-
cial areas in the Chinese zone of influence, e.g., the agreements with Hong Kong or Macau. 
Others are very regional in nature (the pact with ASEAN countries, for example). However, 
China has used bilateral trade agreements to secure access to raw materials (e.g., the trade deals 
with Chile, New Zealand, or Australia, the latter still being under negotiation). Finally, China 
has concluded trade agreements with countries farther away from its own territory, for example 
with Switzerland and Iceland (in 2014).  
China looms large in US trade policy. For example, in its 2015 speech on the State of the Union, 
president Obama said “But as we speak, China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-
growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage. Why would 
we let that happen? We should write those rules. We should level the playing field. That’s why 
I’m asking both parties to give me trade promotion authority to protect American workers with 
strong new trade deals from Asia to Europe that aren’t just free but are also fair. It’s the right 
thing to do.”5 This makes very clear that the US administration sees the ultimate objective of the 
TTIP and TPP agreements in securing a world trade order that limits the influence of China. 
The EU does not advocate the containment of China in such blunt words, but it also has a 
strategic interest in defining the rules of the world economy for the future with countries that 
share a similar state of development and which also adhere, certainly with varying degrees, to 
its model of a social market economy. 
The most important initiatives of the West, which implicitly or explicitly aim at containing Chi-
na are, of course, TTIP and TPP. However, the agreements that the EU has negotiated with 
Canada or that it is being negotiating with Japan also have the potential to be at the detriment of 
China. Finally, given the existing set of agreements of both the EU and the US and the ongoing 
work, almost all OECD members will have mutual bilateral trade pacts with each other. Since 
the resulting spaghetti bowl (as this phenomenon was coined by Jagdish Bhagwati) of uncoordi-
nated trade preferences and rules of origin reduce the value of each of these bilaterals, there is 
an inherent logic to harmonize them. This is an issue in conventional trade agreements focused 
on tariffs, but it is particularly relevant with respect to non-tariff barriers. For example, if the 
                                            
5 Transcript of the speech available at https://medium.com/@WhiteHouse/president-obamas-state-of-the-union-
address-remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery-55f9825449b2. 
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EU were to negotiate different criteria for the participation in public procurement with the US, 
Canada, and Japan, both governments and firms would face unnecessary bureaucratic costs. 
Thus, there is a strong logic to harmonize the different trade agreements that the EU has. But 
since its trade partners also have agreements with the US, these harmonization efforts need to be 
coordinated. The resulting outcome could be a future free trade zone that encompasses all 
OECD countries. For this reason, we study what effects such a trade arrangement would have 
for OECD countries and outsiders, in particular for China. 
Table 5 Western PTA initiatives contain China 
TTIP CETA EU-­‐JPN TPP OECD
USA 2.68 0.04 0.07 1.95 4.55
EU27 2.12 0.22 1.31 0.02 4.46
Rest	  of	  World 0.40 0.04 0.24 0.14 1.67
Rest	  of	  Europe 0.29 0.02 0.32 0.10 0.98
Central	  Asia 0.20 0.02 0.21 0.06 0.63
Eurasian	  Customs	  Union 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.07 0.63
SACU 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.08 0.51
EFTA 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.03 7.68
Canada 0.12 2.97 0.04 2.08 5.53
MENA 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.08 1.09
Latin	  America	  &	  Caribbean 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.54
Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.48
Turkey 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.04 7.32
Oil	  exporters 0.09 0.02 0.21 0.38 0.69
Australia	  &	  New	  Zealand 0.08 0.00 0.15 4.77 9.63
Oceania 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.41
South	  Asia 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.12
MERCOSUR 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04
Alianza	  del	  Pacifico -­‐0.07 -­‐0.01 0.02 0.14 0.62
East	  Asia -­‐0.13 -­‐0.02 1.68 1.74 5.87
ASEAN -­‐0.19 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.03 0.87 -­‐0.45
China -­‐0.23 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.74
World 1.32 0.15 0.60 0.84 3.64
Predicted	  real	  income	  growth	  (in	  %),	  different	  PTAs
 Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Table 5 shows the simulated effects of various trade agreements that the “West” is currently 
negotiating. Both the EU and the US are, through EU-Japan and TPP, talking to Japan, the se-
cond largest economy amongst all OECD members. We model these agreements as deep deals, 
but we are well aware that the broad scope of TPP could well mean that the agreement remains 
below the standards that are likely to be achieved in TTIP. Both agreements yield substantial 
gains to both the EU and the US that are, however, smaller than the gains that TTIP would 
yield. Interestingly, the sum of benefits of TPP and TTIP and of EU-Japan and TTIP are almost 
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exactly equal to the benefits delivered by a comprehensive agreement between all OECD mem-
bers. Note, however, that the extra red tape inherent to a spaghetti bowl of uncoordinated 
agreements are not explicitly modeled, so that we may either underestimate the gains from an 
OECD FTA or overestimate the gains from other agreements, respectively. 
We also find that all agreements shown in Table 5 produce losses for China. For some agree-
ments, these losses may be small: in the case of CETA, the small scale of the Canadian econo-
my limits trade diversion; in the case of TPP, China is protected by strong links to the value 
added chains of close-by TPP members, in particular Japan. For TTIP and EU-Japan China’s 
losses are more pronounced. In the event of a consolidation of trade agreements into an OECD-
FTA (including OECD countries such as South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, that have devel-
oped close trade links with China), the losses are more substantial and reach three quarters of a 
percent. Consistently across all scenarios, the Western trade policy initiatives end up hurting 
China. 
The other region for which the sign pattern is predominantly negative across scenarios is 
ASEAN. However, the US negotiates with ASEAN countries in the context of TPP and the EU 
is negotiating a number of bilateral agreements with important ASEAN countries. So, the over-
all outcome of the current strategies is negative for China, but potentially positive for the most 
other world regions. 
 
3.3.	  China’s	  trade	  policy	  initiatives	  and	  their	  global	  effects	  
Presumably as a result of the aforementioned developments, China has developed a more ambi-
tious trade policy agenda on its own. It negotiates the RCEP agreement with its Southeast Asian 
trade partners. Very recently is has also pushed for a free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP). This treaty was originally proposed by the United States and would cover the 21 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries in Asia, Oceania, North America and the 
Pacific States in Latin America. One obvious difficulty with these agreements lies in the large 
heterogeneity between the countries involved. They differ very strongly with respect to their 
sizes, economic development status, and political orientation. For this reason, it is sensible to 
assume that these agreements are shallow ones: this means, they would result in an almost com-
plete reduction of tariffs, but they go less far than deep agreements with respect to non-tariff 
barriers. 
Table 6 shows the effects of these agreements on average incomes in world regions. First, and 
encouragingly, these mega-regionals are to the benefit of the world as such, even if they are of 
the shallow form. They also tend to benefit countries in almost all world regions (EFTA – the 
European Free Trade Area, consisting of Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Norway – 
being an exception in the context of RCEP).6 The reason for this is the very high degree of trade 
                                            
6 Within the regional groups, there may be countries that lose. 
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openness of China: an increase in China’s income and volume of production generates substan-
tial demand for raw materials, intermediate goods, and final manufactures from essentially all 
parts of the world. This has the power to mitigate negative trade diversion effects.  
For China, FTAAP is about twice as valuable as RCEP. The reason is simply that FTAAP co-
vers a larger share of the world economy. This ranking holds for both the shallow and the deep 
integration scenarios. The latter presents very large gains to China; however, as explained 
above, it is unlikely to materialize.  
 
Table 6 Evaluation of RCEP and FTAAP 
Deep Shallow Deep Shallow
ASEAN 12.28 1.22 21.63 4.70
Australia	  &	  New	  Zealand 9.89 6.35 11.80 7.32
China 7.63 2.13 17.86 5.80
East	  Asia 5.18 1.46 8.84 3.92
South	  Asia 4.82 0.90 7.84 3.54
Oil	  exporters 1.47 0.39 17.22 11.75
Oceania 1.04 0.42 15.53 9.36
Rest	  of	  World 0.84 0.53 26.30 21.45
Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa 0.57 0.16 12.71 8.27
Eurasian	  Customs	  Union 0.50 0.12 9.31 5.84
Rest	  of	  Europe 0.49 0.13 5.87 3.12
MENA 0.45 0.12 10.77 6.35
Central	  Asia 0.42 0.16 11.37 7.75
USA 0.39 0.06 5.26 2.79
Latin	  America	  &	  Caribbean 0.37 0.12 8.62 5.06
SACU 0.37 0.02 11.47 7.48
Canada 0.28 0.02 6.06 3.43
Turkey 0.24 0.06 4.59 2.41
EU27 0.20 0.02 4.80 2.90
MERCOSUR 0.18 0.01 4.69 2.64
Alianza	  del	  Pacifico 0.17 0.00 3.33 1.15
EFTA 0.02 -­‐0.04 4.34 3.00
World 1.85 0.49 7.39 3.67
RCEP FTAAP
Real	  income	  growth	  (in	  %),	  different	  PTAs
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
The Chinese trade policy initiatives do not hurt the US or Europe. However, the growth rates 
predicted for China by far exceed the ones predicted for the US and Europe so that these two 
superpowers would fall behind in relative terms.  
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3.3	  On	  trade	  policy	  consolidation	  within	  the	  OECD	  
Finally, we turn to the case of a consolidated free trade area between all OECD mem-
bers. We have discussed the logic for such an initiative above. Here, we present some 
more results pertaining to this scenario, and we combine it with a completion of the Do-
ha Round (assuming that all remaining tariffs between the 160 WTO members are 
scrapped). 
In the case of a consolidated effort of all OECD countries to form a deep FTA, world 
real income would rise by 3.6%. On average, an OECD FTA is beneficial for develop-
ing countries as well, the associated average real income gain is 0.3%. Still, this OECD 
trade policy strategy would harm China and other ASEAN countries. Cambodia, Tai-
wan, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Bangladesh and the Philippines are in the Top 10 of 
the biggest losers of an OECD FTA, with real income losses between 0.6 and 2%, see 
Table 7. 
Figure 11 World map of real income effects of an OECD FTA, in % 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation.  
 
30 
 
 
Table 7 The 10 biggest losers from an OECD FTA 
Country Region Rank
Real	  
income	  
change	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(in	  %) Rank
Real	  
income	  
change	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(in	  %)
Cambodia ASEAN 1 -­‐1.950 1 -­‐1.667
Taiwan East	  Asia 2 -­‐1.369 17 0.109
Swaziland	  and	  Lesotho SACU 3 -­‐1.156 103 4.563
Malaysia ASEAN 4 -­‐1.029 13 0.052
Thailand ASEAN 5 -­‐0.988 10 -­‐0.267
China China 6 -­‐0.808 11 -­‐0.140
Bangladesh South	  Asia 7 -­‐0.624 4 -­‐0.819
Philippines ASEAN 8 -­‐0.622 5 -­‐0.582
Azerbaijan Central	  Asia 9 -­‐0.467 2 -­‐0.856
Zambia Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa 10 -­‐0.388 21 0.215
OECD	  FTA
OECD	  FTA,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
no	  WTO	  tariffs
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
If the consolidation of an FTA within the OECD would be accompanied by an elimina-
tion of all WTO tariffs, real income could be raised in almost all developing countries 
compared to a situation with an OECD FTA only. The real income gain would rise by 
0.5 percentage points from 0.3% to 0.8%. On the world level, real income would rise by 
3.9 instead of 3.6%. Since this is a GDP-weighted average, the additional gains in de-
veloping countries factors in little (all developing countries contribute to about 23% of 
world GDP only). 
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Figure 12 World map of real income changes from OECD FTA plus elimination of 
WTO tariffs, in % 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
4. Policy	  conclusions	  
In summary, current trade policy moves by industrialized countries seem to be defensive trade 
policy moves against the emerging dominance of China in world trade. While China and many 
of its neighboring countries like the ASEAN members would suffer from TTIP or an OECD 
FTA, such trade liberalization efforts seem to also benefit most of the (not-involved) developing 
countries. The increased income and economic power and thus demand for intermediate and 
final inputs from trade partners seem to outweigh trade diversion leading to positive third coun-
try effects. China and the ASEAN countries tend to be hurt because they have similar produc-
tion structures and lose market shares in the TTIP region. 
However, going forward in multilateral trade negotiations will further benefit almost all coun-
tries in the world. Regionalism by and large is not harmful when taking into account input-
output linkages between countries. But multilateral tariff liberalization is still an important 
source of potential welfare gains for developing countries.  
In the meantime, the mega-regional trade deals prepared by the EU have the potential to pro-
duce losers amongst developing countries. In this study, we have investigated the determinants 
of those losses and we have stressed the importance of spillovers to make the agreements truly 
inclusive. To be more concrete, there are a number of adjustments within the currently negotiat-
ed agreements of the West that could – if implemented – mitigate negative effects of developing 
countries. Here, we discuss three important recommendations: 
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1. The EU and US mega-regionals should avoid complex rules of origin to the greatest extent 
possible; instead, they should enshrine the principle of free movement of goods wherever 
possible. Complicated and narrow rules of origin define that only goods with high shares of 
value added originating in the partner of the agreement qualify for preferential tariff treat-
ment. This has at least two costs: First, documenting the origin becomes costly for firms 
from the partner countries, so that firms may prefer not to utilize the trade preferences, in 
particular if tariffs are already low. Then, the treaties have lower trade-creating effects than 
expected. Second, tough rules of origin can crowd out suppliers from third countries, exacer-
bating trade diversion. Thus, generous and non-bureaucratic rules of origin are in the interest 
of both, the Western partners, and third countries. One could even limit the need to prove the 
origin of goods to cases where the external tariffs of the trade partners are very different 
which is, for example in the EU-US case, only the case in a narrow range of products. 
2. In the area of non-tariff barriers, the agreements should extend the mutual recognition of 
standards to third countries to the greatest extent possible. This means that the application of 
the mutual recognition agreement is not governed by the nationality of producers, but by the 
question whether or not a product – regardless of its origin – satisfies either standard of the 
parties to the agreement. This, of course, requires independent, globally active, accredited 
certification bodies; in other words, a global TÜV. As we have seen in our analysis, if such 
an extension of mutual recognition triggers one-way spillovers, not only do third parties ben-
efit, but the EU or US benefit as well. 
3. Modern trade agreements rightly focus on achieving regulatory convergence and cohesion. 
This is particularly important for products, processes, or services that are not yet fully regu-
lated, such as biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, big data, etc. If the agreements are to shape 
the development of global standards, it is important that third countries are at least informed 
about the regulatory work of the treaty partners. This could be easily achieved by requiring 
very high standards of transparency. The fierce public debate on trade policy, in particular in 
the area of regulatory cooperation, could possibly require that high standards of transparency 
are enshrined into the treaty anyway. Seen from that angle, making as much information on 
regulatory cooperation publically available is a win-win for insiders and outsiders. 
Clearly, there are many further ways to make the West’s modern trade agreements as inclu-
sive as possible. Felbermayr et al. (2015) discuss ten such options. However, the three points 
highlighted above strike us as feasible – supposing that the political will exists – and effec-
tive. 
	  
  
33 
 
 
LITERATURE 
• Aichele R., G. Felbermayr and I. Heiland (2014), The Trade and Welfare Effects of TTIP, 
CESifo Working Paper No 5150. 
• CEPR (2013) “Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic 
Assessment”, Report TRADE10/A2/A16 for the European Commission. 
• Felbermayr, G., W. Kohler, R. Aichele, G. Klee, und E. Yalcin (2015), Mögliche Auswir-
kungen der Transatlantischen Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft (TTIP) auf Entwick-
lungs- und Schwellenländer, Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) 
• Felbermayr, G., B. Heid, M. Larch, and E. Yalcin (2015a), Macroeconomic potentials of 
transatlantic free trade: A high resolution perspective for Europe and the world, Economic 
Policy, forthcoming. 
• WTO (2012), "World Trade Report 2012 - Trade and Public Policies: A Closer Look at 
Non-Tariff Measures in the 21st Century", available at 
http://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/reser_e/wtr_e.htm. 
 
Imprint
© 2015 Bertelsmann Stiftung
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Responsible
Dr. Ulrich Schoof 
Cover Design
Nicole Meyerholz, Bielefeld
Picture
Asia Images | Shutterstock.com
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Adresse | Kontakt
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
GED-Team
Programm Nachhaltig Wirtschaften
Telefon +49 5241 81-81353
ged@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.ged-project.de
